Grue agrees with green until t
An object is grue if it is examined before time t and green, or not so examined and blue. Every emerald examined before t that was green was therefore grue as well.
Define “grue” so that every emerald examined so far is both green and grue. The two hypotheses assign the same probability to every observation before the critical time, so their Bayes factor is exactly 1 and the posterior ratio equals the prior ratio. Which predicate is projectible is a fact about the prior.
Core ideas
Hume asked what justifies projecting the past into the future. Goodman's new riddle asks which pattern in the past to project.
An object is grue if it is examined before time t and green, or not so examined and blue. Every emerald examined before t that was green was therefore grue as well.
If two hypotheses give the observed data the same probability, the data move neither relative to the other, however many observations there are.
Treating green as projectible and grue as not is a judgement made before the data, since the data are the same for both.
The material
The definition first, then the table of what each hypothesis says, then the arithmetic.
Every emerald ever examined has been green. That supports “all emeralds are green”, and by the reasoning of the last lesson it supports “the next emerald will be green”. Now introduce a word.
Fix a time t in the future. An object is grue if it is examined before t and is green, or is not examined before t and is blue.
Every emerald examined so far was examined before t and was green, so it was grue. “All emeralds are grue” has exactly as much observed support as “all emeralds are green”, and the two predict opposite colours for the first emerald examined after t.
The lab takes two outcomes, green and blue, for an emerald as examined. Before t both hypotheses give green probability 1, so their likelihood rows are identical. Put the prior 3/4 on green and 1/4 on grue and enter 100 green emeralds.
If P(data | H) = P(data | H′) then the Bayes factor of H against H′ is 1, and the posterior odds equal the prior odds. With only these two hypotheses it follows that the posterior of H equals its prior.
The lab prints exactly that: the Bayes factor is 1, the posterior of green is still 3/4, and the tile that classifies the data says they are neutral. One hundred emeralds and one thousand do the same, because each multiplies both likelihoods by 1.
The second preset adds the one difference that matters. Suppose the next emerald is examined after t and is green. Under grue it should have been blue, so grue gives it probability 0 and green gives it 1. The Bayes factor is infinite, the posterior of green is 1, and the lab says the data prove green against this one rival. Until such an observation arrives, nothing in the evidence tells the hypotheses apart.
Goodman's riddle is that no formal feature of the data prefers green to grue. The standard replies place the difference elsewhere. One says grue is gerrymandered, because it mentions a time; but a speaker of a language with grue and bleen as primitives would call green the gerrymandered word. Another says natural kinds are the projectible ones, which relocates the question to what makes a kind natural. Each is a claim about the prior, and the lab can show that it must be.
The lab's limit is the same as in the last lesson: it computes from the prior it is given. It does not say that 3/4 on green is the right number, and a reader who sets the prior on grue at 3/4 gets the mirror result.
Interactive
prior times likelihood, normalised; the Bayes factor is the weight of the data
Method
Four steps, applied to any pair of rival hypotheses.
For each observation you have, record the probability each hypothesis gave it. Do this before computing anything.
If the two rows agree on every outcome that occurred, the Bayes factor is exactly 1 and the data are idle between them.
Look for an observation, possible in principle, on which the rows disagree. That is the only kind of evidence that can separate them.
If you favoured one hypothesis while the Bayes factor was 1, the preference came from the prior. Say what justified it.
Prior 3/4 on green and 1/4 on grue; both give a green emerald probability 1 before t.
The posterior ratio equals the prior ratio to the digit. One hundred emeralds were examined, and the evidence for green is exactly the evidence for grue.
Given two hypotheses and a record of observations, you should be able to write their likelihood rows, show that the Bayes factor is 1, compute the posterior from the prior, and name the kind of observation that would separate them.
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