Two sealed envelopes hold money. One holds some amount and the other holds exactly double. You are given one at random and may keep it or swap. You open yours and find 8. The other, you reason, holds 4 if yours is the larger and 16 if yours is the smaller, and the two cases are equally likely because you were handed yours by chance.
other = 4, chance 1/2
other = 16, chance 1/2
worth of switching = (1/2)·4 + (1/2)·16 = 10
Ten is more than eight, so switch. Nothing in this depends on the number 8. If you had found x, the other would be worth (1/2)·(x/2) + (1/2)·2x, which is 5x/4, more than x. Since you would switch whatever you found, you may as well switch without opening. And having switched, the same argument about the new envelope says to switch back. A rule that recommends swapping forever, between envelopes that were symmetric to begin with, is what makes this a paradox.
Definition · The two envelopesThe two envelopes paradox is the argument that you should switch whatever amount you find, from the premise that the other envelope holds half or double with equal probability, and the unacceptable conclusion that two symmetric envelopes are each better than the other.
Which exit is best depends on how the argument is run. Run without opening the envelope, it equivocates. The letter x stands for the amount in your envelope in both cases, but if the pair is some amount and its double, your envelope holds the smaller amount in one case and the larger in the other, so the x in x/2 and the x in 2x are not the same number, and averaging them as if they were is a step that only looks valid. That is exit two, and it is the standard diagnosis of the closed version: written with the pair as y and 2y, switching is worth (1/2)·2y + (1/2)·y whichever envelope you hold, and so is keeping. Run after opening, with the 8 in hand, the step is sound: 4 and 16 are two definite amounts and their average at equal weights is 10. Accepting the conclusion would mean swapping forever, which no one defends. So in the open version look at the premises. One is that the envelopes hold an amount and its double, which is the setup. Another is that you should pick the act of greater expected value, which Decision and Rationality defended. The third is that the chance of “the other is double” is one half, and that one is not part of the setup.
Why was it thought to be? Before you open anything, the chance that yours is the smaller envelope is one half, because it was handed over by chance. The argument carries that one half across the act of opening. But what you learn on opening is the amount, and the amount is evidence about which kind of envelope you hold. A small amount suggests the smaller one, and a large one the larger. The chance after the opening is a posterior, as in “Updating on Evidence”, and a posterior depends on a prior over the pairs.
Now suppose the prior is bounded, so that the pairs come from a finite list. Then there is a largest amount that can appear, and when you see it you know your envelope is the larger. The other holds half, with probability one, and switching is worth half of what you have. The same holds in mirror image at the smallest amount, where you know the other is double. So the chance of “double” is zero at one end of the list and one at the other, and in between it is whatever the prior makes it. It cannot be one half at every amount.
The lab takes the chance as the prior over two hypotheses, “mine is the larger, so the other holds 4” and “mine is the smaller, so the other holds 16”, and takes the payoffs of keeping and switching under each. In the first preset the prior is one half each, which is the premise of the argument for this amount. The lab reports that switching is worth 10 and keeping 8, as the argument said. In the second preset the prior is 1 on the first hypothesis: 8 is the largest amount there is. Keeping is worth 8 and switching only 4. In the third preset the prior is 1 on the second, and switching is worth 16.
Example · Why the interior is not the topAt 8, with one half on each hypothesis, the lab gives switching 10 against 8. If the largest amount in the list is 8, the prior on the second hypothesis there is 0, and the lab gives switching 4 against 8. The same arithmetic, fed a different prior, reverses the advice. No single act is best at every amount, and that is why the always-switch rule cannot be right.
The reply has a price, and it should be stated. Giving up the premise means giving up a very natural thought, that when you know nothing about the amounts the two cases are equally likely. A bounded prior does not say that thought is always wrong. It says the thought cannot be right at every amount, and it leaves the reader free to hold it at the amounts in the middle of the list, as the first preset does.
The lab's limit is the limit of the reply. Every prior here is over finitely many hypotheses, and the payoffs are the amounts, chosen by you. Priors over unboundedly many amounts, some of which give the switching argument an infinite expected value, belong to a harder form of the puzzle that is named in the course home and not built. What the lab computes is that a prior that can be written down, with a largest amount, cannot make the argument work at every amount.