Condorcet's question was whether a group votes better than a person. The case that makes it computable is a jury deciding a question of fact, such as whether the accused did it. Suppose each of n jurors is right with probability p, whatever the others think, and the verdict is whatever more than half of them say.
Take three jurors, each right with probability 3/5. The majority is right when at least two of them are. All three are right with probability (3/5)·(3/5)·(3/5), which is 27/125. Exactly two are right in three ways, according to which juror is wrong, and each way has probability (3/5)·(3/5)·(2/5), so together they have probability 54/125.
all three right (3/5)·(3/5)·(3/5) 27/125
exactly two right 3·(3/5)·(3/5)·(2/5) 54/125
majority right 27/125 + 54/125 81/125
So the majority of three is right with probability 81/125, which is 0.648, while a single juror is right with 3/5, which is 75/125. The jury is better than its members, by a little. The lab prints the exact fraction and works for any number of jurors up to 101.
More voters
With eleven jurors, still each right with probability 3/5, the majority is right with probability 36791901/48828125, about 0.75. The gain from the size of the jury has been substantial. The pattern is general: if p is above 1/2, the probability that the majority is right increases with every added pair of jurors, and tends to certainty.
The pattern reverses on the other side. Three jurors each right with probability 2/5 produce a majority that is right with probability 44/125, which is less than 2/5. Eleven such jurors produce 12036224/48828125, about 0.25. With probability below 1/2 each, the crowd does worse than its members, and the larger the crowd, the worse it does. At exactly 1/2 the crowd gains nothing: eleven jurors, each a coin flip, are right with probability 1/2.
Definition · The Condorcet jury theoremIf voters answer a yes-or-no question independently, each right with the same probability p, then the probability that a majority is right increases with the number of voters when p is above 1/2, decreases when it is below, and stays at 1/2 when it equals 1/2.
What the theorem needs
Two assumptions carry the result, and both are strong. The first is independence: each voter's chance of being right does not depend on how the others voted. Voters who read the same newspaper are not independent; if each follows a newspaper that is right with probability 3/5, a million voters are right together with probability 3/5 and not higher. “Testimony and Independent Witnesses” made the same point about witnesses.
The second is that there is a fact to be right about, and that voters are better than chance at finding it. A vote on a tax rate or a way of life is not an estimate of anything. The theorem's weight rests on the question being of the first kind.
The pivotal voter
The probability that one juror decides the verdict is a different quantity. With three jurors, a given juror decides the result only if the other two split, one right and one wrong, which can happen in two ways: 2·(3/5)·(2/5), which is 12/25. In general, for odd n, the others must divide exactly evenly, and the lab prints that probability.
With eleven jurors at 3/5 it is 1959552/9765625, about 0.20; with eleven coin-flipping jurors, 63/256, about 0.25. The probability shrinks as the electorate grows, and in a national election it is very small. That is the paradox of the pivotal voter: the benefit from any one vote is the probability that it decides, multiplied by whatever is at stake, and the first factor is tiny. The lab computes the first factor and not the second, and what the stakes are worth is a question about welfare, not about probability.