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Lesson · Identity, Modality and Freedom · Modality

Necessity, Possibility and Possible Worlds

“Necessarily p” is not “p and certainly p”. In a possible-worlds model it is true at a world when p holds at every world that world can see, and “possibly p” when p holds at some such world. Compute both from a list of worlds, arcs and atoms, and watch one added arc change the verdict.

□p at w: p at every world w sees ◇p at w: p at some world w sees w sees nothing: □p true, ◇p false same worlds, other arcs: other verdict
Necessity is relative to what a world sees

Core ideas

What this lesson establishes

Modal logic adds two words to the logic of Arguments and Validity, necessarily and possibly, and gives them a meaning by quantifying over worlds. Everything in this course that mentions necessity uses this one rule.

1

A model is worlds, arcs and atoms

A world is a complete way things could be, and the model says which simple sentences are true at each. An arc from one world to another says the second is possible as seen from the first. Nothing else is in the model.

2

The box and the diamond quantify over what a world sees

At a world, □p is true when p is true at every world it sees, and ◇p when p is true at some world it sees. The first is a universal claim and the second an existential one, over the seen worlds only.

3

Necessity depends on the arcs

Hold the atoms fixed and change who sees whom, and □p can change from true to false. So necessity is never a property of p alone; it is a property of p and a model.

The material

Evaluating a box and a diamond

The rule, a model in which it gives a surprising answer, and the case where a world sees nothing.

Definition · Possible-worlds model

A model is a set of worlds, an accessibility relation saying which worlds each world can see, and a valuation saying which sentence letters are true at which world. A formula is evaluated at a world; the same formula can be true at one world and false at another.

The connectives of “Truth Values and the Connectives” work world by world, exactly as before. The two new operators are the only part that looks beyond the world being evaluated, and they look only at the worlds it sees.

□p is true at w iff p is true at every world w sees ◇p is true at w iff p is true at some world w sees

Take a model with two worlds. World w1 sees w2 and nothing else, and the letter p is true at w2 only. At w1 the box asks about the one world w1 sees, w2, and p is true there, so □p is true at w1. But p is not true at w1 itself. That is the surprise the lesson is built around: necessity without truth. In this model p is necessary as seen from w1 and false at w1.

The reading “necessarily p means p is true and certain” fails here for both of its halves. Certainty is a fact about someone’s evidence and the model has no believers in it. Truth at the world itself is not guaranteed either, because w1 does not see itself. Give w1 an arc to w1 and the guarantee returns: the box now includes the world being evaluated, p is false there, and □p is false. This is the first appearance of a fact the next lesson turns into a table: whether necessity implies truth depends on whether worlds see themselves.

A world that sees nothing

The rule for the box is a universal claim over the worlds seen. A universal claim over no worlds has nothing to fail it, so it is true. If w1 sees no world at all, then □p is true at w1 for every p, including a p that is false everywhere, and ◇p is false for every p, since there is no seen world at which to find it. The two operators are linked by ◇p ≡ ¬□¬p, and at a world that sees nothing the pair behaves as the lab shows: necessarily true and possibly false together.

Example · Same atoms, different arcs

Two worlds, p true at w2 only. If w1 sees only w2, then □p is true at w1. If w1 also sees itself, then □p is false at w1. The valuation did not change. One arc did.

The lab quantifies over the worlds you give it, and the arcs are your choice. Whether the arcs for logical necessity, for what is known, or for what is permitted should look one way or another is a question about those subjects, and the lab leaves it open. What it settles is the consequence: given these arcs, this is the verdict.

Interactive

Possible worlds

Modal formulas at every world, and the axioms the frame validates

Worlds and what they can see□ holds where every visible world agrees; ◇ where one does
the formula holdsthe world evaluated

Method

Evaluating a modal formula at a world

Five moves, in this order. The third is where most mistakes happen.

1

List the worlds and what is true at each

Write every world with the sentence letters it makes true. A letter not listed at a world is false there.

2

List the arcs

For each world write the worlds it sees. Check whether a world sees itself, and whether any world sees nothing.

3

Collect the worlds the evaluated world sees

Only these are consulted. A world the evaluated world cannot see is irrelevant to its box, however true or false p is there.

4

Apply the quantifier

For a box, p must hold at every collected world, and at a world that sees nothing it holds vacuously. For a diamond, p must hold at one collected world, and at a world that sees nothing it fails.

5

Compare with the world itself

Read p at the evaluated world. If the box is true and p is false, necessity has come apart from truth, and the cause is an arc that is missing.

Boxes and diamonds at a world

Score 0 / 0

Necessity without truth

Two worlds. The arc runs from w1 to w2, and p is true at w2 only.

w1 sees: w2 p at w2: true so the box of p at w1: true p at w1 itself: false the box is true and p is false now add the arc from w1 to w1 w1 sees: w1, w2 p at w1: false, so the box of p at w1: false

The first verdict is the one a reader finds odd, and the lab prints it. The second shows what repaired it. When a world sees itself, the box includes the world being evaluated, and the odd case disappears.

Common mistakes

1
Reading “necessarily p” as “p is true and certain”In the two-worlds model □p is true at w1 and p is false at w1, so necessity does not even bring truth with it until the world sees itself. And no one in the model is certain of anything, since the model contains worlds, arcs and atoms and no believers. Certainty belongs to the epistemic reading, where the arcs are drawn from what someone knows.
2
Thinking a world that sees nothing makes the box falseThe box is a universal claim and a universal claim over nothing is true. The lab prints it: at w1 in the second preset, which sees nothing, □p is true although p holds only at a world w1 cannot see, and ◇p is false. The surprising value is the one the rule gives.
3
Treating necessity as a property of the sentence aloneThe valuation of p is the same in the first and third presets, and the value of □p at w1 differs between them. The difference is one arc. A claim that something is necessary is a claim about it relative to a model, and a debate about necessity is partly a debate about which arcs to draw.

Check your understanding

✓
Finish when you can compute a box and a diamond from a diagram, and say which arc changed the verdict.

Given worlds, arcs and a valuation, you should be able to state the value of □p and ◇p at a named world, including a world that sees nothing, and to say which single added or removed arc turns a true box into a false one. A verdict stated without the list of worlds it consulted has not yet been computed.

Note: The lab’s status line says what the box is read as. Change the reading menu to epistemic or deontic and only the words change; the computation does not. That is the point of the lesson: one rule for the quantifier, and the subject matter enters through the arcs.

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