The case is a thought experiment, and it is stated so that nothing in it is impossible by the laws of logic. Each half of a person's brain can sustain a mind, and the two halves are removed and placed in two new bodies. Each of the two people who wake is psychologically continuous with the original in every way the previous lesson asked for: memories, intentions, character. Call them A and B.
Three things are then hard to deny together. A is continuous with the original, and B is, because that is how the case was built. Continuity is enough for survival: if someone were connected to me by the chain I would want, that someone is me. And identity is one-one: if A is me and B is me, then A is B, but A and B now lead two lives and have two different bodies. Written out, with the sufficiency claim split over the two survivors, these are five sentences.
1. ca A is continuous with me
2. cb B is continuous with me
3. ca → ia continuity suffices for A to be me
4. cb → ib continuity suffices for B to be me
5. ¬(ia ∧ ib) A and B are not both me
The lab's consistency mode, with the rows of the truth table behind it, finds no row that makes all five true. By sentences 1 and 3, ia is true; by 2 and 4, ib is true; sentence 5 denies their conjunction. The smallest inconsistent subset it reports is all five, so every sentence is needed for the contradiction, and the drop menu shows what each is worth: remove any one and a model is found.
Definition · Minimal inconsistent subsetA set of sentences with no model is minimally inconsistent when removing any one sentence leaves a set that has a model. Every sentence of such a set is doing work, and each is a place where the set can be repaired.
The exits
Dropping sentence 1 or 2 denies the stipulation, and says only one survivor is truly continuous. That changes the case instead of answering it. Dropping sentence 3 or 4 is the more interesting move. A closest-continuer theory says continuity gives identity only when no rival is as close, so that in the case of a tie neither survivor is me. The lab's second preset writes this as continuity suffices only when unbranched, and the set then has a model. The theory adds that in a tie neither survivor is me, and its price is that my survival depends on whether someone else also exists: if only one half had taken, I would have survived, and with both I do not.
Dropping sentence 5 says both A and B are me. One version holds that there were always two people before the division, overlapping in one body, so that the one-one claim is true of people and false of the stages we counted as one. The cost is a count of persons that no one made before the case arose.
The exit that changes the question is Parfit's. Identity, he says, is the wrong thing to want. What matters in survival is the relation of continuity and connectedness, and both A and B have it in full. The third preset replaces sentences 3 and 4 by claims that continuity gives what matters, written ca → ma and cb → mb, and keeps the one-one claim, and the set has a model. Whether A is me is left without an answer that matters, and it is the loss of that answer, not of a person, that Parfit asks you to accept. Whether he is right to say that nothing is lost is the philosophical question, and the lab, which can only test the set, leaves it open.