Learn
Lesson · Identity, Modality and Freedom · Identity over time

Fission and What Matters

Suppose each half of a brain is placed in a new body, and both survivors are continuous with the original. Continuity seems enough for survival, and identity is one-one, and the two claims cannot both hold. The consistency lab finds no model for the five sentences, shows that dropping any one restores a model, and so lists the exits.

A and B are each continuous with me continuity suffices for identity identity is one-one: not both A and B five sentences, no model; drop one, a model Parfit drops the question, not the facts
Four claims, and the case that splits them

Core ideas

What this lesson establishes

The last lesson ended with a chain that runs in a line. Here the chain forks, and the method is the one “Consistency and Belief Sets” taught and “The Regress of Justification” in Knowledge and Evidence applied: write the claims as a set and ask for a model. Two later lessons in this course use it again.

1

Fission is a case, and the claims are the problem

The case is stipulated: after the division two people, A and B, are each psychologically continuous with the original person. What is in dispute is how to describe it, and the description is a set of sentences the lab can test.

2

The set has no model

Write ca for “A is continuous with me” and ia for “A is me”, and likewise cb and ib. The claims are ca, cb, ca → ia, cb → ib and ¬(ia ∧ ib). No row of the truth table makes all five true.

3

Every exit is a deletion

Drop one sentence and a model appears. Each deletion is a position that has been defended, and a reader can choose among them by what each costs.

The material

A split in the chain

The case, the five sentences, the models that appear when one is dropped, and the exit that changes the question.

The case is a thought experiment, and it is stated so that nothing in it is impossible by the laws of logic. Each half of a person's brain can sustain a mind, and the two halves are removed and placed in two new bodies. Each of the two people who wake is psychologically continuous with the original in every way the previous lesson asked for: memories, intentions, character. Call them A and B.

Three things are then hard to deny together. A is continuous with the original, and B is, because that is how the case was built. Continuity is enough for survival: if someone were connected to me by the chain I would want, that someone is me. And identity is one-one: if A is me and B is me, then A is B, but A and B now lead two lives and have two different bodies. Written out, with the sufficiency claim split over the two survivors, these are five sentences.

1. ca A is continuous with me 2. cb B is continuous with me 3. ca → ia continuity suffices for A to be me 4. cb → ib continuity suffices for B to be me 5. ¬(ia ∧ ib) A and B are not both me

The lab's consistency mode, with the rows of the truth table behind it, finds no row that makes all five true. By sentences 1 and 3, ia is true; by 2 and 4, ib is true; sentence 5 denies their conjunction. The smallest inconsistent subset it reports is all five, so every sentence is needed for the contradiction, and the drop menu shows what each is worth: remove any one and a model is found.

Definition · Minimal inconsistent subset

A set of sentences with no model is minimally inconsistent when removing any one sentence leaves a set that has a model. Every sentence of such a set is doing work, and each is a place where the set can be repaired.

The exits

Dropping sentence 1 or 2 denies the stipulation, and says only one survivor is truly continuous. That changes the case instead of answering it. Dropping sentence 3 or 4 is the more interesting move. A closest-continuer theory says continuity gives identity only when no rival is as close, so that in the case of a tie neither survivor is me. The lab's second preset writes this as continuity suffices only when unbranched, and the set then has a model. The theory adds that in a tie neither survivor is me, and its price is that my survival depends on whether someone else also exists: if only one half had taken, I would have survived, and with both I do not.

Dropping sentence 5 says both A and B are me. One version holds that there were always two people before the division, overlapping in one body, so that the one-one claim is true of people and false of the stages we counted as one. The cost is a count of persons that no one made before the case arose.

The exit that changes the question is Parfit's. Identity, he says, is the wrong thing to want. What matters in survival is the relation of continuity and connectedness, and both A and B have it in full. The third preset replaces sentences 3 and 4 by claims that continuity gives what matters, written ca → ma and cb → mb, and keeps the one-one claim, and the set has a model. Whether A is me is left without an answer that matters, and it is the loss of that answer, not of a person, that Parfit asks you to accept. Whether he is right to say that nothing is lost is the philosophical question, and the lab, which can only test the set, leaves it open.

Interactive

Consistency and what must go

Every model, and every minimal inconsistent subset

Can they all be true together?a model makes every kept sentence true; a minimal inconsistent subset has none
TF

Method

Writing a puzzle of identity as a set

Five moves, in this order. The third is the one that is usually done by instinct.

1

State the case as sentences

Write what the thought experiment stipulates, and nothing that is merely natural to say. Here those are the two continuity claims.

2

Write each principle as a sentence

Give the sufficiency of continuity and the one-one nature of identity their own lines. A principle left implicit is a premise nobody can reject.

3

Run the check for a model

If the lab finds none, the set is inconsistent. Read the smallest inconsistent subset: it names the sentences that must be present for the trouble.

4

Delete one sentence at a time

Read the model that appears each time, and say which view of identity it is.

5

State what each view costs

A deletion is a position only when you can say what it gives up. For each exit, name a case in which the cost shows.

Fission as an inconsistent set

Score 0 / 0

The five sentences and the models that remain

Letters: ca and cb for continuity with A and B, ia and ib for being me.

all five: no model drop 5: ia and ib both true is allowed drop 3: ib is forced true, so ia must be false drop 4: ia is forced true, so ib must be false drop 1 or 2: one survivor is not continuous each drop leaves a model; none was avoidable

Nothing in the table says which sentence to keep. Dropping sentence 3 leaves a model in which only B is me, and dropping sentence 4 one in which only A is, and the case was built so that nothing prefers either. A view that keeps both conditionals and yet wants a single survivor has to add a tie-break the five sentences do not contain.

Common mistakes

1
Believing that one of the two survivors must be meThe five sentences do not say so. In the no-branching set the lab finds a model in which neither survivor is me, and one in which exactly one is, and no sentence prefers A to B, since the case was built to be symmetric. The belief that one must be me is sentence 3 or 4 on its own, and it is the claim the case puts under strain.
2
Hearing Parfit as saying the survivors do not matter, or that fission is as bad as deathThe exit keeps both continuity claims and the claim that continuity gives what matters. On his view each survivor has what I should care about in survival, so the case is close to ordinary survival, not death. What goes is the assumption that the question whether A is me has a further answer.
3
Taking an inconsistent set to prove that the case is impossibleThe lab shows that five claims cannot all be true. A reader who holds all five has a contradiction to repair; the case, in which a person divides, is untouched by the check. Whether it can happen is a matter for biology, and the repair is a matter for you.

Check your understanding

✓
Finish when you can write the fission case as a set, name its smallest inconsistent subset, and state what each deletion yields.

You should be able to write the five sentences, run the check and report that no model exists, delete each sentence in turn and say which position the model that appears represents, and state what Parfit's exit gives up. A deletion named without the model it yields has not been checked.

Note: The lab searches the sentences you give it and nothing else. It cannot tell whether continuity really does suffice for survival, whether the division could happen, or whether the description of the survivors is fair; those are the premises.

Kept in this browser only, for you. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing checks it. Carry it to another device.

Feedback and recommendations

Something to change about this lesson? Write it down, tick it off when it is handled, and export the list when you want to act on it. Kept in this browser only: nothing is sent anywhere, and nobody is notified.

No recommendations yet for this lesson.