The previous two lessons gave the dilemma one round. Here the same four payoffs, R = 3, S = 0, T = 5 and P = 1, are played over a stated number of rounds by two strategies, and each player's score is the sum of what the rounds paid.
Definition · Strategy in a repeated gameA strategy is a rule that gives a move, C or D, for every possible history of play. It may depend on what the other player has done, on what the player has done, and on how many rounds have passed.
- ALLC always cooperates and ALLD always defects.
- TFT (tit for tat) cooperates in the first round and afterwards copies the other player's previous move.
- GRIM cooperates until the other player defects once, and defects ever after.
- PAVLOV cooperates first, then repeats its move if the last round paid R or T, and switches otherwise; equivalently it cooperates exactly when both players made the same move last round.
- TF2T (tit for two tats) defects only after two defections in a row.
- STFT (suspicious tit for tat) is TFT with a defection in the first round.
Take TFT against ALLD for ten rounds. In the first round TFT cooperates and ALLD defects, so TFT gets 0 and ALLD gets 5. From then on TFT copies the defection and both defect for nine rounds, one point each round. The lab prints 9 for TFT and 14 for ALLD.
TFT lost that match, and it can never do better than tie any match: it defects only after being defected against, so it cannot score more than its partner. ALLD is the reverse. It scores at least as much as its partner in every match, since it can always choose the strictly better move in a round. A natural inference is that ALLD is the strategy to beat.
The round robin refutes it. ALLD takes 50 from ALLC and 30 from PAVLOV, but only 14 from TFT and from GRIM, 18 from TF2T, and 10 from itself and from STFT. Meanwhile TFT, GRIM, PAVLOV, ALLC and TF2T cooperate in all ten rounds with one another and take 30 each time. Over the whole field TF2T scores 185, TFT 184 and ALLD 146.
Two matches that never defect
TFT against TFT cooperates throughout and each scores 30; so do GRIM and PAVLOV against each other, because neither is ever defected against and so neither ever has cause to respond. Reciprocity is a rule that is silent when met by cooperation, which is why it does not cost anything against a cooperator.
Two limits belong here. The field is seven rules chosen for the lab, and a different field would rank them differently. And the winner at ten rounds is only one point ahead of the next, so the order is not stable: change the number of rounds in the lab and watch it move.