Not knowing what to do is a different thing
A dilemma in this sense is not uncertainty. Every sentence in the set can be settled, and the set is still unsatisfiable. The conflict is among the principles, not in the agent’s knowledge.
A moral dilemma is a situation in which you ought to do each of two things and cannot do both. Written as a set of sentences, two oughts, a principle that oughts combine, a principle that ought implies can, and a fact of inability, it has no model, and all five sentences are needed for the clash. Each way out rejects exactly one.
Core ideas
Arguments and Validity gave the consistency check and the smallest subset that cannot be true together. The dilemma is a case for both.
A dilemma in this sense is not uncertainty. Every sentence in the set can be settled, and the set is still unsatisfiable. The conflict is among the principles, not in the agent’s knowledge.
A smallest inconsistent subset is a set that cannot hold but each of whose parts can. If it is the whole set, every sentence is doing work, and any one sentence given up restores a model.
The set is consistent once a sentence is rejected, but each rejection has a cost, and the genuine dilemma is the case where none is free.
The material
A dilemma written out, its smallest inconsistent subset, and four ways out.
You have promised Ana to be at her door at six, and promised Bo to be at his, on the other side of town, at the same hour. Each promise gives you an obligation, and you cannot keep both. Philosophers who call this a moral dilemma mean something stronger than that it is hard: that you ought to do each, you cannot do both, and neither obligation overrides the other.
A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent ought to do each of two actions, cannot do both, and has no further reason that makes one of the oughts lapse.
The standard argument that dilemmas are impossible uses two principles. Write a for “you ought to keep your promise to Ana”, b for “you ought to keep your promise to Bo”, c for “you ought to keep both” and d for “you can keep both”. The five sentences are below.
The lab finds no assignment of truth values that makes all five true. Sentences 1, 2 and 3 give c; with 4 that gives d; and 5 says not d. The smallest inconsistent subset is all five, so none of them is idle: take any one away and a model exists. This is the sense in which a dilemma is a set that cannot be true together, and it is a fact about the principles and the situation, not about the agent’s ignorance.
The set is also why people disagree about dilemmas, because each of the four ways of restoring consistency is held by someone. Williams keeps both oughts: the remorse you owe whichever promise you break shows, he argues, that the obligation you set aside did not lapse, and what he gives up is agglomeration, since from “you ought to keep each” it does not follow that “you ought to keep both”, and the combined obligation is never formed. A second camp keeps agglomeration and gives up ought-implies-can: you ought to keep both though you cannot, and an obligation can outrun what the situation allows. A third denies one of the first two sentences, holding that when two obligations conflict one of them lapses, so there was never a dilemma; that is the orthodox view, and standard deontic logic is built to deliver it. The fourth says you can keep both after all, by a plan not yet considered, and so denies the situation that made it a dilemma.
Marcus adds a point the lab makes visible. Delete sentence 5 and the remaining four have a model, so the principles were never inconsistent with one another; the clash needed the world to supply not d. On her view that is what a dilemma is, a consistent code meeting an unlucky situation, and it is why she holds there is a further obligation to arrange one’s life so that such situations are rare.
Reject agglomeration, and you have two separate obligations and no obligation to meet them jointly, so it is unclear what a person is doing who fails one. Reject ought-implies-can, and an obligation no longer guides action, since it can demand the impossible. Drop one of the oughts, and the guilt you feel at breaking the promise you set aside has nothing to be about. The lab shows the set is consistent in each case; it does not say which price is the lowest.
The lab sees four letters. That c stands for the conjunction of what a and b say is not something it can tell, which is why agglomeration appears as a sentence in the set. Standard deontic logic builds in agglomeration and ought-implies-can, and so makes dilemmas inconsistent by design. That is itself a position, and the set above lets it be stated rather than assumed.
Interactive
Every model, and every minimal inconsistent subset
Method
Five steps. The fourth is a table and the fifth is a choice, and the lab only does the fourth.
Give each action its own sentence saying you ought to do it, with a letter each.
Write the agglomeration principle and ought-implies-can as conditionals over the letters. If the argument uses a third principle, add it too.
Write that you cannot do both. This is a claim about the situation, not a principle.
The lab reports that no assignment makes all the sentences true, and which sentences are the smallest subset that cannot. If that is all of them, each is needed.
Delete one sentence at a time and see which deletion restores a model. Then say what the deletion costs, because the dilemma is genuine only if each exit does.
Write the situation, find the smallest set that cannot hold, then try each exit.
Each deletion works, which is exactly the problem. A dilemma is real only if every sentence is held for good reason, so that giving any one up has a cost someone will not pay.
Given two conflicting obligations, you should be able to write the five sentences, report that they have no model, name the smallest inconsistent subset, and say for each deletion which principle was rejected and what that costs.
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