Definition · ConsistencyA set of sentences is consistent when at least one row of its table makes every member true. Such a row is a model of the set. A set with no model is inconsistent.
Start with the smallest interesting case. The set contains p → q, p and ¬q. Read the three together: if the first two hold, q must hold, and the third denies it. This is modus ponens with its conclusion turned into a premise, and the table shows that no row survives.
p q | p → q p ¬q
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T T | T T F
T F | F T T
F T | T F F
F F | T F T
Every row has a false cell, so there is no model and the set is inconsistent. The lab reports this as zero rows of four. Note what kind of fact this is. No pair of these sentences contradicts another: p → q with p is fine, p with ¬q is fine, and p → q with ¬q is fine. The trouble appears only when all three are held at once.
Definition · Minimal inconsistent subsetA subset that cannot all be true, and that becomes possible when any one member is removed, is a minimal inconsistent subset. A set may have several. The lab reports the smallest, and among those of equal size the one that comes first by sentence number.
Sentences outside the minimal subset are innocent of this particular failure. Add q → r to the set above and the smallest failing subset is still the first three. Added sentences cannot repair an inconsistency, because every row that fails already fails.
Now the part that matters for philosophy. An inconsistent set tells you that at least one member is false. It does not tell you which. In the four-sentence set p → q, q → r, p, ¬r the lab lets you give up each sentence in turn, and each time exactly one model appears:
give up model that appears
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1 p → q p=T q=F r=F
2 q → r p=T q=T r=F
3 p p=F q=F r=F
4 ¬r p=T q=T r=T
All four repairs work, and they describe four different worlds. Which to choose is a question about the sentences themselves: how much you trust each, what each costs to lose, what else depends on it. The table is neutral. That neutrality is why a skeptic's valid argument forces a choice and cannot make it.
Consistency is also weaker than truth. The set p ∨ q, ¬p, q → r is consistent, with one model, p false and q and r true. That means the three sentences could all be true. Whether they are is again a question about the world, which no lab here answers.